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Abstract: 
We examine changes in market values and accounting returns for a sample of publicly traded 
Chinese firms around announcements of large block-share transfers among government 
agencies (“State Bureaucrats”), market-oriented State-owned enterprises (“MOSOEs”) and 
private investors (“Private Entities”). We find evidence that these large block transfers are true 
control transactions for all types of block holders, resulting in positive abnormal returns around 
the transfer announcements. Moreover, we provide evidence that transfers from State 
Bureaucrats and MOSOEs result in larger increases in market value and accounting returns than 
transfers from Private Entities—consistent with their superior incentives and expertise relative 
to State block holders. We also find that CEO turnover occurs more quickly when shares are 
transferred to Private Entities. We conclude that corporate governance can be improved at 
State-controlled firms by improving the incentives and managerial expertise of controlling 
block holders, and that this is better accomplished by transferring ownership to private investors 
rather than by shuffling ownership among State-controlled entities.  
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Improving corporate governance where the State is the controlling block holder:  
Evidence from China 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The State usually remains the controlling block holder after a share-issuance 
privatization (“SIP”). In a study of 630 SIPs from 59 countries, Jones et al. (1999) find that the 
median-ownership offering by the State was only 35%, leaving the government not only with a 
controlling stake but also with majority-ownership in the majority of SIPs. This raises several 
important questions: Who is the more effective monitor of management of a listed firm—the 
State or a private owner? Can the State improve performance by making governance changes 
that go short of full privatization? For example, can the State improve performance by 
transferring ownership from bureaucrats to managers of corporatized State-owned enterprises, 
who have better incentives and experience than bureaucrats? In this study, we attempt to shed 
new light on these important questions by examining 631 negotiated block trades among 
different State-controlled and private shareholders in China during 1998-2002.  
Most empirical studies of privatizations find that full privatizations and, to a lesser 
extent, partial privatizations lead to improvements in firm performance (see the surveys by 
Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002)).1 Our study analyzes the impact 
of changes in corporate governance after partial privatization of State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) has been completed. Focusing on these “second round” changes in ownership, we find 
that significantly larger improvements in firm performance do occur when control is transferred 
to private owners than when control is transferred to “market-oriented” SOEs. Thus, consistent 
with the literature on block-holder identity, we show that the specific managerial expertise and 
incentives of block holders are important determinants of firm value (see the seminal article by 
Barclay and Holderness (1991) and a recent survey by Holderness (2003)). 
                                               
1
 Full privatization refers to the transfer of control from the State to private owners whereas 
partial privatization refers to the issuance of publicly traded shares by a State-owned enterprise 
where the State maintains majority ownership and/or control. Sun and Tong (2003) and Gupta 
(2005) study the impact of partial privatizations in China and India, respectively. 
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 We choose to analyze Chinese firms because intra-governmental block transfers were 
relatively common in China and reflected efforts by the Chinese government to improve 
corporate governance, while maintaining ultimate control at the country’s largest firms.2 The 
Chinese government used two basic ownership structures to participate in the equity of listed 
companies: (1) direct control through State Bureaucrats at government agencies and ministries; 
and (2) indirect, but ultimate, control through Market-Oriented State-Owned Enterprises 
(MOSOEs).3  
 There are important differences in the expertise and incentives of these two ownership 
structures, which are critically important because Barclay and Holderness (1991, p. 887) 
“document that the specific skills and incentives of large block shareholder, and not just 
concentration, affect firm value.” First, managers of MOSOEs have superior industry expertise, 
as they are actively managing their corporations, which often are in the same industry as the 
corporations of which they are block holders, whereas State Bureaucrats may have little or no 
experience in corporate management of any kind. Second, the incentives faced by managers of 
MOSOEs and State Bureaucrats differ, in large part, by how they are compensated. State 
Bureaucrats are not directly rewarded based on the financial performance of the firms they 
monitor (Xu and Wang, 1999), whereas managers of MOSOEs are partially rewarded based on 
their firm’s financial performance (Groves et al., 1995; Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006).  In addition, 
MOSOEs are allowed to retain after-tax profits for internal use, providing their managers with 
                                               
2
 Official documents and speeches indicate that the Chinese government intended to maintain 
ultimate control over a large segment of the Chinese economy, including those that had been 
partially privatized. See, for example, President Jiang Zemin’s speech at the 15th Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 1997. According to some observers, Chinese 
authorities sought to improve the corporate governance of State-controlled firms as a means of 
avoiding further privatization (Lin, 2000; Cao, 2000).   
 
3
 This classification relies, in part, on the concept of the “ultimate controlling shareholder” 
introduced in La Porta et al. (1999, pp. 475-476). Without the concept of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder, we would not be able to identify firms controlled by SOEs as being 
ultimately controlled by the State. 
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additional incentive to maximize profits. Furthermore, as separate legal entities, MOSOEs are 
expected to be more focused on commercial objectives (Broadman, 1997).  
 In this study, we investigate changes in value and performance when block transfers 
occur at firms that have been partially privatized, but where the State maintained a controlling 
interest. We find large and significant improvements in value and performance when block are 
transferred, and that these improvements are significantly larger when blocks are transferred 
from State control to private control rather than transferred between two State-controlled 
entities.  
Our results show the importance of these differences in identity of the block holder. For 
example, focusing on block transfers of at least 20%, we find the excess returns surrounding the 
announcement of transfers from a State Bureaucrat to a Private Entity average 33.6%, as 
compared with 26.6% for block transfers between a State Bureaucrat and a MOSOE and 20.9% 
for block transfers between two State Bureaucrats.  These large value increases around control 
transfers to a Private Entity are mirrored in significant improvements in accounting 
performance following block transfers from a State Bureaucrat or MOSOE to a Private Entity. 
In the two years after the year in which these transfers are announced, the annual return on 
assets is higher by more than 300 basis points when compared with the two years before the 
transfer announcement.   
Furthermore, CEO turnover is faster when control is transferred to a Private Entity.  
Replacement of the CEO within three months of the block-transfer announcement is 
significantly less likely when a State Bureaucrat is the seller or buyer. These differences 
disappear when we look at replacements within 12 months of the block-transfer announcement. 
We contribute to the literature in at least three important ways.  First, we extend the 
literature on block-holder identity and partial corporate control (Holderness and Sheehan, 1985 
and 1990; Barclay and Holderness, 1991; Bethel, Leibeskind, and Opler, 1998; Franks and 
Mayer, 2001).  We provide new evidence from Chinese markets that changes in firm value 
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associated with negotiated block transfers, and subsequent changes in top management, are 
functions of the incentives and managerial skills of the new block holders.  Specifically, we find 
that share transfers to private block holders are most effective in improving corporate 
governance and increasing firm value (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Because many of the world’s largest enterprises, both listed and 
unlisted, have the State as the controlling block holder (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang, 2000), we regard this as an important extension of current research that has 
focused exclusively on share transfers between private block holders.   
Second, we contribute to the literature on how State ownership affects the performance 
of partially privatized firms (Kole and Mulherin, 1997; Sun and Tong, 2003; Boubakri, Cosset 
and Guedhami, 2005a; D’Souza, Megginson and Nash, 2005; Gupta, 2005). Our results show 
that block transfers at partially privatized State-controlled firms where the State reduces or 
relinquishes its ownership share are associated with increases in market values and 
improvements in accounting performance that are significantly greater than those associated 
with block transfers among other types of block holders. This is innovative because we isolate 
the effect of privatization, i.e., change from State to private control, from the effects of issuing 
public equity.4   
 Third, we contribute to the literature on why State-owned firms perform poorly. The 
“political view” posits that politicians interfere and pursue political objectives other than profit 
maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), whereas the “managerial view” posits that the State 
is a poor monitor because there is no individual with strong incentive nor is there a public price 
                                               
4
 Gupta (2005) shows that stock market listing of State-controlled firms improves performance 
because of the role the stock market plays in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance 
even when there is no change in control. In addition, studies of equity offerings have shown that 
changes in firm performance around the time of initial public offerings are affected by decisions 
to issue shares during hot markets (Ritter 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995), or to manipulate 
earnings prior to share issuance (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998; Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000; 
DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik, 2003; Chen and Yuan, 2004). 
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to provide information (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).5 It is difficult to separate both effects for 
SIPs. However, the firms in our sample do have public prices and managers of market-oriented 
SOEs do have incentives to maximize firm value, yet we find that private monitors are superior 
to State monitors. Hence, our evidence is more supportive of the political view than the 
managerial view, and complements Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007), which finds that politically 
connected Chinese firms perform more poorly than other listed Chinese firms on both a market-
value and accounting basis.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present a brief 
review of the literature on privatization and block holder identity, and provide institutional 
details about Chinese stock market and ownership structure of Chinese firms.  We discuss the 
role of the Chinese government and develop hypotheses in Section 3.  In Section 4, we describe 
our data and methodology.  In Section 5, we present the results of our empirical analysis and, in 
Section 6, we provide a summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review and Institutional Background  
2.1 Review of the Privatization Literature 
 Denis and McConnell (2003) write that “privatization is a natural experiment allowing 
us to examine how corporate governance mechanisms evolve, interact and affect firm 
performance.” Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) provide 
comprehensive reviews of studies published prior to 2000, which generally find that privately 
owned firms are more profitable and efficient than similar SOEs. In Appendix Table 1, we 
briefly summarize the findings of some of the most prominent multi-country studies of 
privatization (Panel A), as well as some of the more recent studies that look at partial 
privatization (Panel B). In general, most of the studies of privatizations find that full 
                                               
5
 Without share-price information, managers miss important signals about their behaviour, face 
restrictions on performance compensation and are insulated from the “market for corporate 
control.” 
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privatizations lead to improvements in performance; and, to a lesser extent, most of the studies 
of partial privatizations find improvements in firm performance following partial privatization, 
as well. 
2.2. Historical Perspective on the Chinese Privatization Experience 
In the traditional Chinese SOE that existed from the 1950s until the early 1980s, the 
central government held 100% of the control rights and cash-flow rights, although much of the 
residual cash flows from SOEs were allocated to local governments where the SOEs were 
located. Managers of SOEs were hired and fired by Communist Party officials who led the 
government agencies or ministries responsible for overseeing the SOEs and to which the SOE 
managers reported. Managers were evaluated based upon their ability to meet agency/ministry 
plans, which involved political as much as economic criteria. Funding for SOEs came in the 
form of “policy loans” from State-owned banks, which essentially allocated capital to the 
Chinese economy rather than performing traditional banking functions. So long as an SOE 
fulfilled its policy role, the central government would ensure that it received funds needed for 
operations regardless of profitability or solvency. Under such a system, it is not surprising that 
SOEs were notoriously unprofitable and inefficient. 
Beginning in 1984, the Chinese government sought to improve the efficiency of its 
SOEs through a series of gradual reforms that began with the accordance of “legal-person” 
status to SOEs, which was intended to make SOEs responsible for performance (see Schipani 
and Liu (2002)). In addition, the central government transferred both the control rights and 
residual cash-flow rights to local-government entities. By pairing cash-flow rights with control 
rights at the local government level, this reform provided local government with the incentive to 
improve SOE performance.  
Local governments responded to the incentives provided by their newfound cash-flow 
and control rights by implementing a series of governance reforms that Groves et al. (1995) 
classify into three strands: (i) giving SOE managers more autonomy from Communist Party 
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officials at the agencies and ministries to which they reported; (ii) allowing SOEs to retain a 
portion of any profits they produced; and (iii) developing governance mechanisms to reward 
SOE managers for superior firm productivity.  
In 1993, the National People’s Congress enacted the Chinese Corporate Law of 1993, 
which paved the way for partial privatization of the largest of SOEs.  This law defined two 
types of corporations: closely held and publicly held. For publicly held corporations, the law 
required a governance structure consisting of shareholders who exercise their rights at a general 
meeting, a board of directors and a board of supervisors. The law also established the positions 
of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors. For closely held corporations, the Corporate 
Law sets forth similar requirements, but with some exceptions.  
2.3. Partial Privatization and Official Share Classification 
The (partial) privatization of Chinese SOEs began years before passage of the Corporate 
Law of 1993 when the Shanghai Municipal Government approved a set of regional securities 
regulations in 1984. That approval was followed in the same year by the issuance of shares in 
an electronics company, which began to trade on an over-the-counter market run by the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 1986 (see Ellman, 1988; Qi, Wu and Zhang, 
2000).   
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) was established in December of 1990, followed 
by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in April 1991. Seven SOEs went public during 1991. 
Also in 1991, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”)—the Chinese 
equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission—was established to monitor and 
regulate the two stock exchanges and their members. 
  From 1992-2002, the number of listed firms rose from 53 to 1,224, while the market 
capitalization rose from $13 billion in 1992 to a peak of $579 billion in 2000. Each exchange 
accounts for approximately half of the total number of firms in each year. 
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In China, there are several different “official” classes of shares.  Shares are classified 
based on the residency of their owner as domestic (A shares) or foreign (B, H and N shares).  
Domestic A shares are further divided into State shares, Legal-Person shares, Tradable A 
shares, and Employee shares, of which only Tradable A shares, as the name implies, are 
publicly traded on one of China’s two stock exchanges. All shares of a listed company have the 
same voting rights and cash-flow rights, i.e., one share is entitled to one vote. 6 
The distinction between State shares and Legal-Person shares is murky, at best, and 
emanate from a 1994 regulation dealing with restructuring of SOEs. State shares are those held 
by government agencies (e.g., the Bureau of State Property Management and local finance 
bureaus) and by some types of corporatized SOEs. For most listed companies, State shares 
make up the largest percentage ownership of any classification.  Legal-Person (LP) shares are 
those owned by domestic corporations or other non-individual legal persons. Hence, this 
category includes shares held by the government through legal-person entities, as well as shares 
held by private entities, both domestic and foreign. Like State shares, Legal-Person shares 
cannot be traded on the two exchanges or transferred to foreign investors, but can be transferred 
to domestic corporations, when approved by the CSRC.  
2.4 Alternative Share Classification 
There are serious shortcomings in the official share classification for any analysis of 
corporate governance of listed firms in China. To illustrate the confusion, we refer to Table 5 in 
Delios et al. (2006), where the authors report the overlap between their 17 (ultimate) ownership 
categories and the official Share Classification. For example, of the 556 times a State Asset 
Management Bureau (SAMB) was classified as a top-10 shareholder in a listed firm in their 
                                               
6
 Tradable A shares are owned by individual Chinese residents and domestic legal persons, but 
are not allowed to be owned by foreign investors. Individuals are prohibited from holding more 
than 0.5% of total shares outstanding for any listed company. Regulators typically require that 
Tradable A shares account for more than 25% of total outstanding shares when a company is 
listed.  The market price of a listed company refers to the price of Tradable A shares. Employee 
shares are owned by the employees of a listed company.  Shareholding by managers is small, 
with average ownership as low as 0.005%, according to Tian (2001). 
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sample, the SAMB was officially classified as holder of State shares 105 times (19 percent), as 
a Legal-Person shareholder 221 times (40 percent), and in 230 cases the SAMB was classified 
as Tradable-A shareholder or Other. Similarly, Private corporations were officially classified as 
holders of State shares in 7.4 percent of the cases, as holder of Legal-Person shares in 59.8 
percent of the cases, and as holder of Tradable-A shares or Other in 32.8 percent of the cases.  
Because of these ambiguities, we adopt the classification scheme of Chinese ownership 
developed by the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) Business School and described in 
Delios et al. (2006). The NUS-classification produces 17 detailed classes of non-tradable 
shares, which we regroup in four groups of ultimate owners. The groups are as follows (where 
we refer to the Delios et al. (2006) detailed classifications in parentheses). State Bureaucrat 
includes: central government (1); local governments (2); government ministries (3); government 
bureaus (4); State asset-investment bureaus (6); State asset-management bureaus (7); State 
research institutes (10); and State-owned banks (16). Market-Oriented SOE includes companies 
that formerly were government ministries (5); market-oriented state-owned enterprises (9) and 
infrastructure construction companies (8). Private Entity includes security companies (11); 
investment funds (12); private companies (13); private individuals (14); and work unions (17). 
Foreign Entity includes foreign companies and individuals (15).  
The distinction between State Bureaucrat and Market-Oriented SOE (“MOSOE”) is 
important because the incentives (e.g., profit-sharing) and expertise (e.g., managerial and 
industry expertise) of managers of market-oriented SOEs are fundamentally different from 
those of government bureaucrats. We return to this issue in the next section. 
 Table 1 shows the distribution of ownership categories of the largest block holder for 
listed firms by year, from 1993-2002, based upon our classification scheme. Beginning in 1996, 
MOSOEs dominate the sample. The number of State Bureaucrats remains relatively constant 
from 1996-2002, while the number of Private Entities steadily increases from 13 in 1993 to 155 
in 2002. The number of Foreign Entities ranges from 9 in 1993, to 18 in 1996. (The annual total 
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numbers of firms in Table 1 does not equal the total number of firms each year because NUS 
was unable to classify a small number of firms.) 
 
3. Ownership Structures and Hypotheses 
3.1 Government Ownership Structures 
Because of differences in incentives and residual cash-flow rights, we expect that the 
two alternative government ownership structures (State Bureaucrats vs. MOSOEs) have 
differential impacts on firm value, even though the State is the ultimate controlling shareholder 
in each case. A State Bureaucrat (“SB”), such as the Bureau of State Property Management or a 
local finance bureau, exercises ownership rights on behalf of the Chinese State.  When a SB 
controls the majority of a company’s shares, officials of the block holder have the right to select 
managers and board members, and to veto business and investment plans proposed by firm 
management. As government officials, however, the officials are prohibited from involvement 
in the management of State-controlled firms.7  
SB officials have no residual cash-flow rights from the companies they monitor; all 
dividend revenues from the companies under their control are submitted to the Ministry of 
Finance or to local governments. Moreover, SB officials are not rewarded based on the 
performance of the SOEs that they monitor (Xu and Wang, 1999; Lin 2000).8   
SB officials typically have little or no management experience and little industry-
specific knowledge (Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006).  Hence, it is difficult for them to evaluate 
management decisions. The promotion of SB officials depends largely on how well they execute 
the instructions of central or local government rather than how much they contribute to creating 
firm value or dividend revenues. Based on these characteristics, we hypothesize that SB-
                                               
7
 In the 1984 “Decision on Reform of the Economic Structure,” it is declared that government 
departments will not manage or operate enterprises directly (Cao, 2000). This measure was 
aimed at transforming State-run enterprises into State-owned enterprises. 
 
8
 Of course, SB-officials (as well as MOSOE-officials) enjoy the benefits of indirect perquisites, 
which can be substantial, including luxury housing, car with driver, expense accounts, etc. 
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officials are unlikely to have profit maximization as the primary goal for SB-controlled listed 
firms. 
In contrast to SB officials, the managers of MOSOEs typically receive explicit monetary 
rewards based on their firm’s performance (Groves et al., 1995; Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006). 
This incentive compensation at MOSOEs should mitigate agency problems between the 
controlling block holders (the MOSOE) and minority shareholders of the listed firm. 
Furthermore, MOSOEs have a degree of autonomy and are allowed to retain their after-tax 
profits, which can be used according to their own plans.  These factors provide managers of 
MOSOEs with greater incentive to focus on profitability than managers of SBs.9   
Finally, changes in the identity of the block holder can increase firm value by improving 
the quality of management and/or monitoring (Barclay and Holderness 1991).  Because of their 
managerial experience in industry, we expect that MOSOE block holders are more efficient and 
professional than government officials in monitoring the firms under their control.  In some 
cases, MOSOEs contribute directly to the listed firms under their control, in the form of 
management, capital or new technology. According to Zou (2004), the Chairman of the 
MOSOE-controlled listed firms is also the Chairman of the parent MOSOE in more than 60 
percent of the cases. This number is only 16 percent for listed companies that are controlled by 
SBs. Furthermore, Chen and Wang (2004) show that top-executive turnover is significantly 
more sensitive to firm performance at listed firms controlled by MOSOEs than at listed firms 
controlled by SBs. 
3.2 Private Ownership Structure 
When a private entity is the controlling block holder, the incentives of the block holder 
are most closely aligned with those of minority shareholders. Private block holders receive 
                                               
9
 When we analyze share transfers among State entities, it is unlikely that there is a substantial 
change in the calculated control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate owner around the 
share transfers in our study. Fan, Wong and Zhang (2005) show that, across a sample of 750 
State-controlled firms, the average ratio of cash flow to voting rights of the ultimate owner 
equals 96 percent.  
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100% of the cash flows to which the block holder is entitled, in contrast to both government 
ownership structures. Hence, private block holders are more likely than State block holders to 
pursue the maximization of shareholder wealth. Also, private block holders choose managers on 
the basis of their ability to maximize shareholder wealth (or, at least, to maximize the 
controlling block holder’s wealth) whereas State block holders choose managers based, often in 
large part, upon political considerations and the ability to meet social objectives. 
However, controlling block holders also have incentives to expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders, especially in countries with weak investor protection (La Porta et al. 
1999; Johnson et al. 2000). Fan, Wong and Zhang (2005) show that, across a sample of 750 
State-controlled firms, the average ratio of cash flow to voting rights of the ultimate owner 
equals 0.96. For the 62 listed firms in their sample that are controlled by private entities, they 
find that the average ratio of the cash flow to voting rights is 0.54. Given the larger wedge 
between cash flow and control rights at listed firms with private entities as ultimate owner, we 
conjecture that expropriation of minority shareholder wealth is more severe after block transfers 
to private owners.10 We provide more evidence on this issue in our results section.   
3.3 Hypotheses 
The typical method used to transfer control at listed companies is known as a share-
transfer agreement. Once a share-transfer agreement is reached between two parties, the listed 
company will apply to the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance to obtain approval. At the same 
time, the firm will make a public announcement regarding the proposed changes in its 
ownership structure.   
First and foremost, we expect that negotiated block transfers are corporate control 
transactions in China, just as they are in the U.S., and lead to positive abnormal returns—
consistent with the findings of Barclay and Holderness (1991). Therefore, our first hypothesis is 
                                               
10
 Evidence in Berkman, Cole and Fu (2009) is consistent with this conjecture. These authors 
find that Chinese firms are more likely to issue loan guarantees to their controlling block 
holder—a form of tunneling—when the controlling block holder is private rather than State 
controlled, either directly or indirectly through an SOE. 
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that we will observe positive and significant abnormal returns around announcements of these 
block transfers. The null hypothesis is that there are no abnormal returns around these 
announcements. 
Also consistent with Barclay and Holderness, we expect that differences in the 
incentives and expertise of managers at SBs,  MOSOEs and Private Entities will lead to 
statistically significant differences in the magnitudes of abnormal returns around the 
announcements of these block transfers. More specifically, we hypothesize that MOSOE block 
holders are more likely to contribute to value creation than SB block holders, and that Private 
Entity block holders are more likely to contribute to value creation than either type of State 
block holder. This should be observable in differences in magnitudes of abnormal returns and in 
the subsequent accounting performance following the announcements of block share transfers 
from SBs to MOSOEs, relative to share transfers from SBs to SBs, and from SBs or MOSOEs to 
Private Entities; abnormal returns should be larger and accounting performance should be 
superior. Conversely, abnormal returns should be smaller and accounting performance should 
be inferior for transfers  from  MOSOEs to SBs relative to share transfers from SBs to SBs, and 
from Private Entities to SBs or MOSOEs. We refer to this as the incentive hypothesis. 
One alternative view of block transfers from SBs to MOSOEs is that such transfers 
introduce an additional level of bureaucracy that might oppose changes (Broadman, 1997). 
MOSOEs are typically fully owned and controlled by the State.  Their weak governance 
structure might simply be mapped onto the listed company as MOSOEs themselves are often 
owned by SBs. If so, then we should expect lower returns around the announcements of block 
transfers from SBs to MOSOEs, relative to transfers from SBs to SBs, and we should expect 
accounting performance to deteriorate in years following the announcement of transfers from 
SBs to MOSOEs. We refer to this as the added-bureaucracy hypothesis. 
Yet another view of block transfers arises from the widely publicized manipulation of 
stock prices at Chinese firms. According to this view of the world, negotiated block transfers 
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are revealed to insiders long before they are publicly announced in the financial press.  This 
presents insiders who own non-tradable shares the opportunity to accumulate large positions in 
Tradeable A shares in the names of family, friends or fictitious parties prior to public 
announcement of the block transfer. Once the transfer is made public, along with promises to 
restructure the listed firm, investors bid up the stock price. At that point, the insiders dump their 
shares, earning substantial profits, but also putting downward pressure on the share price. 
Longer term, the attractive restructuring plan that caused the share price increase is never 
implemented, so the accounting performance fails to improve or deteriorates during the years 
subsequent to the block transfer.  We refer to this as the manipulation hypothesis. The 
manipulation hypothesis predicts positive abnormal returns preceding share transfers, 
irrespective of the identity of the initial owner. Moreover, these positive abnormal returns 
should be reversed post-announcement as insiders sell off their shares.11 Appendix 2 documents 
several cases of manipulation. 
Our final hypothesis deals with the incentive of a controlling block holder to expropriate 
wealth from minority shareholders. While all three types of controlling block holders face this 
incentive, a private block holder might be able to more easily accomplish expropriation by 
tunnelling resources from the listed firm to a privately held company that she also controls, but 
where she holds all of the cash-flow rights rather than only a portion. A scandal surrounding the 
De Long Group is an example of this type of behaviour, where a private controlling block 
holder—Tang Wanxin—expropriated wealth from listed companies that he controlled to a 
privately held parent company that he also controlled, but where he held greater cash-flow 
rights. We refer to this hypothesis as the expropriation hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that 
accounting performance will deteriorate during the years subsequent to the block transfer and 
                                               
11
 A closely related hypothesis is that overly optimistic investors trade on rumors and bid up 
share prices in the pre-announcement period. Because short sales were not allowed in China 
during the sample period, overly pessimistic investors were unable to express their opinions.  
The predictions regarding this hypothesis are identical to those of the manipulation hypothesis 
so we don’t go into more detail. 
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that this deterioration will be greatest for transfers to private block holders. To the extent that 
investors anticipate this expropriation, the hypothesis also predicts lower excess returns around 
the announcement of such block transfers, and that excess returns will be lowest for 
announcements of transfers to private block holders. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1.1 Sample Selection 
We include in our sample all SHSE and SZSE firms that, during the five-year period 
from 1998 through 2002, reported share transfers that are greater than 5% of the total number of 
shares outstanding. The announcement dates were obtained from GTA/CSMAR, one of the 
largest corporate information providers in China. Our sample period starts in 1998, so that all 
events in our sample were announced subsequent to the September 1997 Chinese Communist 
Party’s 15th Congress where the Central Committee endorsed a major policy shift, committing 
to a large privatization program. We confirmed each block transfer using ownership data 
obtained from the database of Chinese ownership developed by the National University of 
Singapore (“NUS”) Business School, and described in Section 3.  This database ends in 2002.  
We begin with a sample of 1,040 successful block-share transfers. We are unable to 
match 189 of these transfers with the NUS database, leaving 851 share transfers. Of these 
transfers, 171 involve more than one transaction on the same day for the same firm. We delete 
36 of these transfers from our sample because the sellers or buyers involved in the multiple 
transfers are from different ownership categories. We combine the percentage of shares 
transferred for the remaining transactions if the parties involved in the multiple transfers are the 
same, or if the sellers involved are from the same ownership category (State Bureaucrat, 
MOSOE or Private Entity), and the buyers involved are from the same ownership category 
(State Bureaucrat, MOSOE or Private Entity). This procedure leaves us with 717 observations.  
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In order to have a sharp distinction between the three main ownership groups—State 
Bureaucrats, MOSOEs and Private Entities—we exclude 50 transfers involving parties that are 
classified as ‘companies that formerly were government ministries’ (NUS category 5); State 
research institutes (NUS category 10); State-owned banks (NUS category 16) and work unions 
(NUS category 17).  
We also exclude 21 transfers involving foreign entities (NUS category 15). Most of 
these transfers only involve transfers between two foreign entities, and only three of these 
transfers are larger than 20 percent of the shares. This leaves us with 646 transfers.  
In the final step in the sample selection, we require that the firms in our sample have 
accounting data and stock-price data in the year prior to the transfer. This requirement reduces 
our final sample to 631 block transfers. 
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics regarding the pre-transfer ownership structure and 
firm characteristics of the sample.  Panel A of Table 2 reports the results for the total sample, 
while Panels B-F of Table 2 report the results for the different subsamples based on the identity 
of the seller and buyer.  
In Panel A of Table 2, we see that the average percentage of shares being transferred is 
22.0 and ranges from 5 percent to 74.8 percent. We measure firm size by the natural logarithm 
of the book value of total assets.  Our financial data were obtained from GTA. The average size 
of firms in our sample is RMB1.18 billion (US$143 million), and firm size ranges from RMB 
70 million to RMB 22.1 billion.   
We calculate the leverage ratio for each firm as its book value of total liabilities divided 
by its book value of total assets.  The average leverage ratio is 46.8%.12  The high leverage 
ratios in our sample reflect the fact that most listed Chinese companies use bank loans as their 
primary source of capital. The four largest banks in China, which control the majority of 
                                               
12
 There are no finance companies in the sample.  
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banking assets in the country, are directly controlled by the Chinese government. These banks 
typically allocate credit to individual firms on the basis of national policy, but do not have the 
power to force a firm into liquidation.  
We calculate peer-adjusted return on assets (ROA) as the firm’s core EBITDA divided 
by the book value of total assets as of year-end less core EBITDA divided by the book value of 
total assets as of year-end for a matched firm. We define core EBITDA as profit or loss from 
core operating activities.13 We select a matched firm for each of our sample firms where the 
matched firm is in the same industry and has the lowest absolute value of the difference in the 
ratio of core EBITDA over total assets in the pre-transfer year relative to the sample firm across 
all firms in the same industry. We define industry sectors at the level of two-digit SIC codes, 
which we obtained from the CSRC. The average peer-adjusted ROA for our sample firms in the 
year before the transfer is significantly negative at −0.8 percent (t-statistic is −3.0).  
We follow Berkman, Cole and Fu (2010) in calculating the annual level of firm-specific 
expropriation as the sum of the value of potentially harmful related-party transactions in a 
particular year, scaled by total assets of that firm as of year-end.  ∆EXPROP is defined as the 
level of expropriation in the year after the block transfer less the level in the year prior to the 
year of the block transfer. Data on related-party transactions come from GTA. The average 
change in the level of expropriation is close to zero. 
 In Panels B through G of Table 2, we present the descriptive statistics for each of the 
nine seller-buyer pairs. From Panel B, we see that State Bureaucrats were involved as seller in 
167 transfers, and as buyer in 85 transfers. MOSOEs were sellers in 340 transfers and buyers in 
308 transfers. Finally, Private Entities were involved as seller in 124 transfers and as buyer in 
238 transfers. These numbers reflect a clear shift in ownership from State Bureaucrats to 
Private Entities over our five-year sample period. 
                                               
13
 China’s standardized income statement separates the operating results into (1) “profit or loss 
from core operating activities” and (2) “profit or loss from non-core operating activities”. Chen 
and Yuan (2001) documents that earnings management is more likely to involve non-operating 
profits. 
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 Panel C of Table 2 shows that transfers involving State Bureaucrats as sellers are 
largest, on average, at 26.5 percent of the shares outstanding. When State Bureaucrats are 
involved in the transfers as buyers, the average transfer size is 25 percent. Test 1, shown in the 
last column of the panel, reports the results of an F-test for equality of the mean transfer 
percentages across the three ownership categories, and shows the percentage of shares 
transferred is significantly different across the three seller categories. Similarly, Test 2, in the 
bottom row of the panel, indicates significant differences in the percentage of shares transferred 
across the different types of buyers.   
 In Panel D of Table 2, we see that transfers where State Bureaucrats or MOSOEs are 
involved in transfers as buyers or sellers are significantly larger than transfers to or from private 
owners. 
Panels E, F and G in Table 2 show the leverage, peer-adjusted ROA, and change in the 
level of expropriation, respectively, for each pair of seller and buyer. Average leverage is 0.47, 
average peer-adjusted ROA is -0.008, and average change in the level of expropriation is 0.009, 
but there are no significant differences across types of seller/buyer. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to evaluate the efficiency of alternative 
categories of block owners of listed firms in China.  First, we analyze share-price responses 
around block-transfer announcement dates for the full sample, and for several portfolios, based 
on the ownership of the seller and the buyer.  Second, we analyze the change in accounting 
performance in the years around the block transfer. Finally, we examine changes in the top 
management during the period following the block transfer announcements.  
We use the market-adjusted return model to calculate daily abnormal returns as the 
difference between the realized return and the market return.14 To estimate the market-adjusted 
                                               
14
 Our results are robust to use of the market model for estimation of abnormal returns. 
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model, we use as the market index either the SHSE or the SZSE composite index, depending on 
where the firm’s stock is listed. Both composite indices are value-weighted, consisting of all 
listed companies on each stock exchange. Our primary event window spans day t–210 through 
day t+40.15 We use a long event window motivated by concerns that market information 
leakage and insider trading are not unusual in the Chinese markets.16  For robustness, we also 
examine abnormal returns from a more traditional five-day event window spanning day t–3 to 
day t+1. In addition, we analyze changes in peer-adjusted return on assets and peer-adjusted 
return on equity around ownership transfers, as well as CEO turnover in the three months and 
twelve months following the transfer announcement.  
Our event-study approach to analyze the impact of ownership changes might help to 
reduce endogeneity problems, which affect studies using cross-sectional regressions of firm 
value against ownership variables (see Holderness (2003)). If changes in ownership structure 
are exogenous, changes in firm value and performance would directly result from these 
ownership changes. However, it is possible that both changes in ownership and changes in 
valuation are caused by a third factor, e.g., good business prospects. In this case, the new block 
holders do not cause superior future performance; rather, they simply are able to identify and 
negotiate block transfers of shares in firms with better future prospects, or the State simply 
decides to order such ownership changes.  
To address this possibility, we employ a two-stage sample-selection model as suggested 
by Heckman (1979) in our multivariate analysis of changes in ownership and firm 
performance/value, where, in the first stage, we estimate the probability that a firm will 
experience a change in ownership as a function of past firm performance and other 
                                               
15
 For some companies, trading is halted on the event day.  In these cases, we use the closing 
price for the next day as the day t−0 share price.  
16
 See, for example, the article ‘Stocks, Lies and Manipulation’, Business China, September 11, 
2000, pp. 4-5, and several cases in Appendix 2. When we use a 150-day window starting on day 
t-125, we obtain similar results. 
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characteristics. We then calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio from this first-stage regression and 
include it as an explanatory variable in our second-stage regressions. 
 
5. Results 
 First, we present the results from our univariate analyses, where we focus on the relation 
between the variable of interest (changes in firm value, accounting performance and CEO 
turnover) and the identity of the buyer and the identity of the seller. In the second part of this 
section, we present the results of cross-sectional regression models, where we account for 
characteristics of the transfer, characteristics of the listed firm whose shares are transferred, and 
sample selection bias.   
5.1 Univariate Analysis  
5.1.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Figure 1 graphs the cumulative abnormal returns from day t–240 to day t+100 for our 
full sample of 631 transfers (“All”) and, separately, for 38 transfers between State Bureaucrats 
(“SB2SB”) and for 49 transfers from State Bureaucrats to Private Entities (“SB2PE”). Clearly 
evident in set of CARs is the share-price run-up from approximately day t–210 through day t–1, 
suggestive of information leakage and insider trading.  Somewhat surprisingly, Barclay and 
Holderness (1991, p. 865) document a similar pattern for negotiated block transfers between 
private U.S. firms for day t–240 through day t–1.  
Also evident in Figure 1 is the large run-up in the share prices of 49 firms experiencing 
SB2PE transfers and the 28 firms experiencing SB2SB transfers, supportive of first 
hypothesis—that, first and foremost, block transfers are control events associated with positive 
abnormal returns. Moreover, the run-up in share prices of the 49 firms experiencing SB2PE 
transfers is much larger than for the 38 firms experiencing SB2SB transfers—supportive of our 
hypothesis regarding the superior incentives and experience of private block holders relative to 
State Bureaucrat block holders. Finally, note that the gains prior to t–1 are not reversed 
 - 21 - 
subsequent to the announcements—evidence that is inconsistent with the manipulation 
hypothesis. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAR) for day t–210 through day t+40, and day t–3 through day t+1. We present these 
results for the full sample of 631 transfers that are larger than 5% of the shares outstanding, and 
for a smaller sample of 292 transfers that are larger than 20% of the shares outstanding.  
As shown in Panel A, the average CAR for the full sample over the period from day t–
210 through day t+40 is a statistically significant 17.1% (t-statistic = 11.59), which is 
approximately the same as the average CAR for the period from day t–240 through t+40 
reported by Barclay and Holderness (1991) for block transfers between private U.S. firms.17 In 
contrast, Franks and Mayer (2001) analyze a sample of block transfers at German firms and find 
that the benefits of control transfers do not accrue to minority shareholders. They attribute this 
result to the weak protection of minority shareholders in Germany. In light of their finding and 
given the relatively weak minority shareholder protection in China18, the large value increase 
around the block transfers in China is remarkable and suggestive of substantial improvement in 
firm performance after the block transfer.  
The average CAR over the period t−210 through t+40 for the 292 transfers of blocks 
transfers greater than 20% of the shares outstanding is a statistically significant 21.0% 
(t-statistic = 8.91).19  The average CAR over the shorter five-day window from day t–3 through 
                                               
17
 When making this comparison, it is important to keep in mind the significant differences in 
the Chinese stock market, where insider trading is rampant and the U.S. market, where insider 
trading is closely monitored and, when identified, is vigorously prosecuted by the U.S. 
securities regulators. 
 
18
 MacNeil (2002) estimates that the LLSV index of minority shareholder protection for China 
is only two out of a possible score of six, compared to an average score of four for common-law 
jurisdictions and an average of three for all countries. He also discusses the difficulties of 
enforcing minority shareholder rights in China. 
 
19
 The average CAR of the 339 transfers that are smaller than 20% of the shares outstanding is 
13.7% and is significantly smaller than the average CAR of the large transfers at the 1% level.  
We have also split the sample according to whether or not the transfer resulted in a change in 
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day t+1 is 1.1 percent for the whole sample and 1.7 percent for the block transfers in excess of 
20 percent of the shares outstanding.20 Each of these CARs is statistically significant at better 
than the 1% level, with a t-statistic greater than 6.00. 
In Panel B of Table 3, we present the average 250-day CARs for the nine different 
buyer/seller groups of block transfers greater than five percent of common shares. With the 
exception of transfers from Private Entities to State Bureaucrats and to MOSOEs, the CARs in 
all cells are positive and significantly different from zero.  
Transfers where the State Bureaucrats are sellers have the largest average CAR of 
21.6%. Within this group, CARs for transfers to State Bureaucrats, to MOSOEs and to Private 
Entities are 17.2%, 21.4% and 25.0%, respectively. For transfers from MOSOEs, the average 
CAR is 16.7%. Within this group, CARs for transfers to State Bureaucrats, to MOSOEs and to 
Private Entities are 11.1%, 18.5% and 15.8%, respectively. For transfers from Private Entities, 
the average CAR is 11.9%. Within this group, CARs for transfers to State Bureaucrats, to 
MOSOEs and to Private Entities are 10.6%, 10.6% and 12.8%, respectively.  
The difference in CARs between different sellers is significant at the 5% level (Test 1 in 
the last column of Table 4, Panel B). There is no evidence that the identity of the buyer is 
significantly related to the CAR (Test 2 in the last row in Table 4, Panel B). For the full sample, 
the CAR ranges from 13.8% if a State Bureaucrat is the buyer to 18.1% if an MOSOE is the 
buyer. 
The results in Panel C of Table 3, for transfers in excess of 20% of the shares, show 
even larger differences. Again, CARs are largest for transfers from State Bureaucrats at 26.4%. 
Within this group, CARs for transfers to State Bureaucrats, to MOSOEs and to Private Entities 
are 20.1%, 26.6% and 33.6%, respectively. For transfers from MOSOEs, the average CAR is 
                                                                                                                                                      
control (i.e., a new largest shareholder). There is no significant difference in CARs based on 
this classification (results are not reported). 
 
20
 Again, the average CAR around large transfers is significantly larger than the 0.6% average 
CAR around the transfers smaller than 20% of the shares outstanding.  
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20.5%. Within this group, CARs for transfers to State Bureaucrats, to MOSOEs and to Private 
Entities are 17.1%, 19.8% and 24.6%, respectively. For transfers from Private Entities., the 
average CAR is 9.3%. Within this group, CARs for transfers to State Bureaucrats, to MOSOEs 
and to Private Entities are -2.6%, 3.9% and 16.8%, respectively.  
Again, the differences across the three types of sellers are significant at the 5% level 
(Test 1 in the last column of Table 4, Panel B). Focusing on the buyers, we see that the CARs 
range from 17.6% for transfers where a State Bureaucrat is the buyers to 24.9% for transfers 
where a Private Entities is the buyers. Even though these differences in CARs have the 
expected ordering, the differences are not statistically significant (Test 2 in the last row in Table 
3, Panel C). 
In general, the results in Panels B and C show that transfers from State Bureaucrats to 
Private Entities generate the highest CARs while transfers from Private Entities to State 
Bureaucrats generate the lowest CARs. Only transfers to Private Entities are consistently 
positive and significant and only transfers from State Bureaucrats are consistently positive and 
significant. Transfers from State Bureaucrats to State Bureaucrats, from MOSOEs to MOSOEs 
and from Private Entities to Private Entities all are positive and significant, consistent with the 
results of Barclay and Holderness (1991), and suggestive of heterogeneity with each of these 
three ownership classifications, i.e., there are “better” and “worse” monitors within each type of 
ownership. 
Overall, the results in Table 3 are supportive of the incentive hypothesis, which states 
that block transfers from State Bureaucrats result in the largest wealth gains to shareholders.  
The results in Table 3 are inconsistent with the added-bureaucracy hypothesis that a transfer 
from a State Bureaucrats to MOSOEs simply adds an additional level of bureaucracy to the 
governance structure, thereby reducing the quality of the government control. On the contrary, 
further tests show that the average CAR is significantly higher around transfers when State 
Bureaucrats are the sellers, than around transfers where MOSOEs are the sellers (the p-value 
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for this difference in average CAR of 4.9% for the full sample is 0.04). The results in Table 3 
are also inconsistent with the idea that expropriation by private entities results in value 
decreases after private entities obtain control over the listed firm.  
The substantial value increase before the announcement is consistent with the 
manipulation hypothesis as well as the incentive hypothesis.  In order to distinguish between the 
two, we partition our event window into a pre-announcement period from day t–210 through 
day t–0 and a post-announcement period from day t+1 through day t+40. According to the 
manipulation hypothesis, we would expect positive CARs during the pre-announcement period, 
negative CARs during the post-announcement period, and a negative and significant correlation 
coefficient between the CAR in the pre-announcement period and the CAR in the post-
announcement period. According to the incentive hypothesis, we would expect positive CARs 
during the pre-announcement period, non-negative CARs during the post-announcement period, 
and a non-negative correlation coefficient between the two. 
Consistent with both hypotheses, the average CAR during the pre-announcement period 
for the full sample is a statistically significant 16.0%. However, the average CARs during the 
post-announcement period is positive 1.1% (insignificant), which is inconsistent with the 
manipulation hypothesis but supportive of the incentive hypothesis. Moreover, the correlation 
between pre-announcement (t–210 through t–0) and post-announcement (t+1 through t+40) 
CARs is 0.01 and statistically insignificant, which also is inconsistent with the manipulation 
hypothesis, but supportive of the incentive hypothesis.  
We repeat these tests for each of the nine classes of block transfers and find no evidence 
of significant negative correlations for any of these classes.  We also obtain qualitatively similar 
results analyzing the correlations between the CARs from a 50-day pre-announcement window 
and the CARs from a 10-day post-announcement window.  
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5.1.2 Changes in Accounting Performance  
 According to the incentive hypothesis, we expect to find significant improvements in 
accounting performance following the block transfers, and we expect these improvements to be 
significantly related to the 250-day CAR and five-day CAR.  
For each firm involved in a block transfer, we collect accounting data on firm 
performance for two years before, and two years after, the year of the block transfer 
announcement (thus excluding the year of the transfer). We test two alternative measures of 
firm performance: peer-adjusted return on assets and peer-adjusted return on equity.21 Peer-
adjusted performance each year is calculated by subtracting the peer’s performance measure for 
that year from the firm’s performance measure for that year. We select peers based upon 
industry and pre-event performance, where the peer firm is the firm with the lowest absolute 
value of the difference in ROA relative to the sample firm across all firms in the same industry 
in the pre-transfer year. 
Return on assets (ROA) is defined as core EBITDA divided by total assets, and return on 
equity is defined as core EBITDA divided by total equity.  For 106 firms, we were unable to 
obtain the required accounting data in the pre- or post-announcement periods and these 106 
firms are omitted from this part of our analysis.   
We average peer-adjusted performance for the two years in the pre-announcement 
period and for the two years in the post-announcement period. We then subtract the 
performance in the pre-announcement period from the performance in the post-announcement 
period to obtain the changes in accounting performance.  Results of this analysis appear in 
Table 4.   
From Panel A of Table 4, we see that, for the full sample, peer-adjusted ROA increased 
by 140 basis points and peer-adjusted ROE increased by 190 basis points—both significant at 
the 5% level.  Focusing on the group of block transfers in excess of 20%, the improvement in 
                                               
21
 We obtain similar results when we measure performance using industry-adjusted ROA and 
industry-adjusted ROE. 
 - 26 - 
peer-adjusted ROA is 170 basis points, and the improvement in adjusted ROE is 290 basis 
points. Again, the improvement in each performance measure is significant at the 5% level.22 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the changes in peer-adjusted ROA for the nine different 
combinations of sellers and buyers of transfers greater than 5%. Among the three groups of 
sellers, the largest increase in peer-adjusted ROA is 190 basis point for MOSOEs, closely 
followed by State Bureaucrats (170 basis point); for transfers where the seller is a Private 
Entity, peer-adjusted ROA falls by 30 basis points. However, these differences across sellers are 
not significant for the full sample (p-value=0.15). The results in Panel C of Table 4, where we 
only examine transfers greater than 20%, the results among sellers are similar but stronger. The 
changes in peer-adjusted ROA are 230 basis points, 240 basis points and -190 basis points, 
respectively, for State Bureaucrats, MOSOEs and Private Entities. The differences among these 
three groups are statistically significant at the 10% level (p-value=0.07). 
Among buyers, we find the opposite ordering, with the Private Entities and MOSOEs 
showing large increases in peer-adjusted ROA, while State Bureaucrats show small declines in 
peer-adjusted ROA. Among the transfers greater than 5% (Panel B), the differences are 
statistically significant at the 5% level (p-value=0.04); among the smaller sample of transfers 
greater than 20% (Panel C), the differences lack statistical significance (p-value=0.31). 
In general, the results in Table 4 suggest that accounting performance improved 
following the block transfers, again favoring the incentive hypothesis over the manipulation 
hypothesis, the expropriation hypothesis, and the added-bureaucracy hypothesis. The 
differences in improvement based on the identity of the parties involved, suggest that State 
Bureaucrats are less efficient monitors than Private Entities, with MOSOEs somewhere in 
between.   
                                               
22
 There is no significant difference in the change in peer-adjusted ROA and peer-adjusted ROE 
between the transfers that are larger than 20 percent and the transfers that are smaller than 20 
percent. 
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In Table 5, we report the correlations between the two performance measures and the 
two CAR measures. For both the long-term window and the short-term window, and for both 
peer-adjusted ROA and peer-adjusted ROE, we find significant positive correlations, ranging 
from 0.168 to 0.309. These highly significant correlations suggest that investors were able to 
successfully anticipate future improvements in operating performance subsequent to share 
transfers. 
5.1.3. Post-transfer Changes in Top Management 
According to Barclay and Holderness (1991), a block transfer is a control event if it is 
associated with large abnormal stock returns and top-management turnover.  Even though firms 
in China operate in a very different control environment than in the U.S. and other developed 
countries, it is still instructive to analyze cross-sectional differences in top management 
turnover at our sample of firms undergoing block transfers.  
The results of this analysis appear in Table 6. Panel A of Table 6 shows that, for our full 
sample, the CEO was replaced at 22% of the firms within 3 months of the transfer, and at 38% 
of the firms within 12 months of the transfer.  For the subsample of block transfers larger than 
20%, CEO turnover is 30% within the 3 months of the transfer, and is 50% within the 12 
months of the transfer.23 By comparison, Barclay and Holderness (1991) report a 33 percent  
CEO turnover rate within the 12 months following negotiated block trades at a sample of U.S. 
listed firms.  Also note that the turnover rates after block transfers are high compared to the 
average frequency with which CEOs are replaced at the typical listed Chinese firm, which, for 
our sample period, was 24 percent per annum. 
In Panels B and C of Table 6, we document the impact of the identity of the seller and 
buyer on CEO turnover within the first 3 months after the transfer for our full sample of 
transfers greater than 5% (Panel B) and for our subsample of transfers greater than 20% (Panel 
                                               
23
 The likelihood of CEO turnover in the 3 months (12 months) following the transfer 
announcement for the 339 transfers that are smaller than 20 percent of the shares outstanding is 
15 percent (27 percent), and is significantly smaller than the likelihood of CEO turnover 
following large transfers. 
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C). In Panel B, we see that the overall 21.7% frequency of CEO replacement within three 
months depends significantly on the seller, and is highest at 29% when Private Entities are the 
sellers and lowest when at 18% when State Bureaucrats are the sellers. The difference in CEO 
turnover across sellers is significant at the 10% level (p-value=0.07). We see a similar pattern 
across buyers, where CEO replacement is 22.3% when the buyers are Private Entities and 
lowest at 17.6% when the buyers are State Bureaucrats; however, differences across buyers are 
not statistically significant (p-value=0.62). 
When we look only at block transfers in excess of 20 percent (Panel C), we find that the 
overall CEO replacement rate is much higher at 29.8%. Among sellers, we find statistically 
significant differences (p-value=0.03), ranging from 24.5% at State Bureaucrats to 28.9% at 
MOSOEs and 46.3% at Private Entities. We also find statistically significant differences (p-
value=0.04) among buyers, ranging from 18.8% at State Bureaucrats to 28.9% at MOSOEs and 
39.4% at Private Entities. These results are supportive of the hypothesis that the identity of the 
block holder is an important determinant of CEO turnover and suggest that CEO turnover is 
more likely when a Private Entity is involved and less likely when a State Bureaucrat is 
involved as either buyer or seller.  
Finally, in Panel D of Table 6, we explore the reasons for CEO turnover using data from 
the GTA corporate governance database. GTA classifies the reason for CEO turnover into 
twelve categories that we collapse into seven: (1) Change in Work Assignment; (2) Expiration 
of Term in Office; (3) Change of Controlling Shareholder; (4) Resignation; (5) Corporate 
Governance Improvement; (6) Missing; and (7) Other.  
In Columns 2-4 of Panel D are the results for CEO turnover during 1998-2002 at all 
listed Chinese firms. There are a total of 5,272 firm-years covered by these data. In Columns 5-
7 of Panel D are the results for our full sample of 631 firms covering CEO turnover during the 3 
months following the transfer announcements. There are a total of 631 firms × (3 months / 12 
months) = 157.75 firm-years in this group. In columns 8-10 are the results for our full sample of 
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631 firms covering CEO turnover during the 12 months following the transfer announcements. 
There are 631 firms × (12 months / 12 months) = 631 firm-years in this group. For each of these 
three groups, we report the total number of CEO changes (columns 2, 5 and 8), the number of 
CEO changes per firm-year (columns 3, 6 and 9), and the percentage of the total number of 
CEO changes for that group accounted for by each reason identified in Column 1 (Columns 4, 7 
and 10). 
Most relevant are the numbers of CEO changes per firm-year (Columns 3, 6 and 9). 
CEO turnover attributable to a Change of Share Controlling Rights is 0.023 per firm year for all 
listed firms, 0.368 per firm year for our sample during the 3 months following the block transfer 
announcement and 0.124 for our sample during the 12 months following the block transfer 
announcement. Using the binomial test, we find that these proportions are significantly higher 
for our sample firms than for the total sample at better than the 1% level. The same result holds 
for the categories Expiration of Term of Office, Resignation and Missing in the three-month 
sample, and for Expiration of Term of Office and Other in the twelve-month sample.  
Also relevant are the percentage of all CEO changes in each group accounted for by the 
Change of Share Controlling Rights. For all listed firms, Change of Share Control Rights 
accounts for 10% of all CEO turnovers; but for our sample, it accounts for 42% of the CEO 
changes that occur with 3 months and 33% of the CEO changes that occur with 12 months, of 
the block-transfer announcements. Clearly, these results demonstrate that the high incidence of 
CEO turnover in our sample is a direct result of the block transfers. 
5.1.4 Univariate Robustness tests 
We also reran the univariate analyses of CARs, ROA/ROE and CEO turnover appearing 
in Panels C of Tables 3, 4 and 6 where we subset our data based upon the 306 observations 
where transfer resulted in a change in the controlling shareholder (Largest Change = 1) rather 
than the 292 observations where the transfer was greater than 20% of the outstanding common 
shares. In general, these results, which are available from the authors upon request, are 
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qualitatively similar to those obtained where we subset based upon transfers greater than 20%. 
Relative to the full sample of 631 observations where the transfer is greater than 5%, average 
Seller CAR is larger (19.3% vs. 17.1%, average Seller ROA is larger (240 basis points vs. 140 
basis points), and average Seller CEO turnover is greater (29.6% vs. 21.7%). However, the 
results of Test 1 (an F-test for statistically significant differences in the averages for the three 
types of sellers) are weaker (p-values = 0.68, 0.13 and 0.12 for Tables 3, 4 and 6, respectively) 
than those obtained where we subset on transfers greater than 20% (p-values = 0.05, 0.07 and 
0.03 for Tables 3, 4 and 6, respectively). These univariate results suggest that differences 
among sellers are greater when new large block holders are included in the analysis, regardless 
of whether the transfer created a new controlling block holder. 
 
5.2 Multivariate Cross-sectional Regressions 
To provide additional evidence on the sources of abnormal returns, the changes in 
accounting performance and CEO turnover, we also perform cross-sectional regressions. For 
our multivariate analysis, we utilize the two-stage methodology suggested by Heckman (1979), 
where we first estimate the probability that a firm experienced a block transfer, and then 
estimate the relation between changes in ownership and performance, including the Inverse 
Mills’ Ratio estimated from our selection equation to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
5.2.1 First-Stage Probit Regression 
Table 7 presents the results from our first-stage probit regression to explain differences 
in firms that did and did not experience negotiated block transfers in each year. We have a total 
of 5,678 firm-year observations over the 1998-2002 period, of which 631 identify firm-years in 
which a block transfer took place. As explanatory variables, we focus on firm and performance 
characteristics. We include firm size and peer-adjusted return on assets in the previous year to 
account for the possibility that smaller and less profitable firms were chosen for these block 
transfers. We also include dummy variables indicating controlling ownership by State 
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Bureaucrats and MOSOEs to account for the possibility that these types of firms were chosen 
for block transfers disproportionately relative to the omitted category of Private Entities. 
Finally, we include the percentage ownership of the controlling shareholder to account for the 
possibility that smaller controlling blocks are more likely to be involved in transfers. 
As shown in Table 7, each of our explanatory variables is negative and statistically 
significant at better than the 1% level. Because we estimate this equation primarily to obtain the 
inverse Mills’ ratio for inclusion in subsequent regressions, we do not discuss these results in 
any more detail, other than to note that there are strong and significant differences in firms that 
did and did not experience block transfers, supporting the importance of employing a selection 
equation in our estimation. 
5.2.2 Second Stage Regressions 
 In our second-stage regressions, we use various performance measures as our dependent 
variables and use the type of seller and buyer as our explanatory variables, along with several 
control variables and the Inverse Mills Ratio Lambda from our first-stage regression.  For each 
of the dependent variables, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression model: 
DVi = β0 + β1 Seller Bureaucrati + β2 Seller MOSOEi + β3 Buyer Bureaucrati  
+ β4 Buyer MOSOEi + β5 Relatedi +  β6   Largest Changei  + β7 PCTi   
+
  
β8 Leverage Ratioi + β9  Sizei + β10  ΔEXPROP  +  β11  Lambdai + εi 
where: 
  DVi is, for firm i, the 250–day or 5–day cumulative abnormal return; the change in peer-
adjusted return on assets or peer-adjusted return on equity; or a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if the CEO was replaced in the first 3 months or 12 months after the transfer announcement.   
Seller-Bureaucrati,  Seller-MOSOEi  Buyer-Bureaucrati and Buyer-MOSOEi are dummy 
variables indicating the type of negotiated block transfer; Seller-Private and Buyer-Private are 
the omitted categories, so the coefficient on each of the Seller and Buyer dummy variables 
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measures the difference in the dependent variable (DV) of that category and the dependent 
variable of transfers involving Private Entities.   
Relatedi is a dummy variable indicating that the buyer is a related party of the seller. 
Parties are related if, one party is directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by another 
party, or both parties are under the control of the same enterprise. We expect the benefits of 
block transfers to be lower when the transfer is to a related party. 
Largest Changei is a dummy variable indicating that the transfer created a new 
controlling block holder for firm i. It might be important to distinguish between a transfer that 
creates a new controlling block holder and one that does not.  When the block transfer creates a 
new largest shareholder, there has been a change in corporate control.  According to Barclay 
and Holderness (1991), block transfers as small as 10% of outstanding shares can transfer de 
facto control rights. Because of the strong position of the controlling shareholder in China, we 
expect the positive effects of the block transfers to be larger when the new block holder obtains 
a controlling share. 
Percentage Transferred i is defined as the number of shares that is transferred in the 
block transfer as percentage of the shares outstanding. 
As general control variables, we include:  
Leverage Ratio as measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets;   
Firm Size as measured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets;  
Lambda, the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first-stage probit selection model; and  
ΔEXPROP, our ex-post measure of the change in the level of expropriation.   
We expect that excess returns and operating performance improvement will be larger at 
firms with greater informational asymmetries, as agency costs are expected to increase with the 
level of informational asymmetries. Because larger firms are less opaque than smaller firms, we 
hypothesize that excess returns will be inversely related to firm size. In Western economies, 
firms with greater leverage are subject to more stringent monitoring by large creditors, 
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including commercial banks, so that informational asymmetries should be smaller than at firms 
with greater leverage.  However, in China, commercial banks are often directed by the State to 
make policy loans, so that banks do not serve this monitoring role in China.  Instead, banks are 
directed by the State to make additional loans to poorly performing firms, increasing their 
leverage over time. Hence, we expect that excess returns will be positively related to the debt-
to-asset ratio, as the worst performing firms have the most to gain from improved governance.24 
We include Lambda to mitigate concerns about endogeneity, and ΔEXPROP to control for 
changes in the level of expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Table 8 presents the results of our cross-sectional regression models. For each 
dependent variable, we first present the results for the full sample of transfers greater than 5%, 
and then, in the next column, report the results for the subsample of transfers greater than 20%.  
5.2.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8, we use the 250–day CAR as our dependent variable. 
Column 2 reports the results for the full sample, and Column 3 reports the results for the sample 
of transfers that are larger than 20% of the shares outstanding. Both Seller Bureaucrat and 
Seller MOSOE are positive and statistically significant at better than the 5% level. Both Buyer 
Bureaucrat and Buyer MOSOE are negative, as expected, but lack statistical significance. The 
dummy variables also are economically significant. Ceteris paribus, transfers from State 
Bureaucrats to Private Entities result in a 250-day CAR that is 12.4% larger than that for 
transfers between Private Entities (the omitted dummy variables) for the full sample; for the 
subsample of transfers greater than 20%, this difference is 25.8%.   
The results using the 5-day CARs appear in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 8, and generally 
are consistent with those using the 250-day CARs; both Seller Bureaucrat and Seller MOSOE 
are positive and statistically significant at better than the 5% level, although the magnitudes are 
                                               
24
 We have estimated all models including year dummy variables, industry dummy variables 
and exchange dummy variables. Our results are robust to inclusion of these dummy variables. 
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much smaller, in the range of 1% to 2%. These results again suggest that investors perceive 
Private Entities to be superior monitors relative to State Bureaucrats and MOSOEs.  
The coefficient of Related is insignificant in all four models, indicating that investors do 
not perceive the value change resulting from transactions between related parties as different 
from transactions between unrelated parties.  
The coefficient of Largest Change is insignificant.  We had expected that transfers 
creating a new controlling block holder would be associated with greater cumulative abnormal 
returns, but this does not appear to be the case when we control for the type of block transfer. 
Similarly, Percentage is only weakly related to the 250-day or the 5-day CARs.  
Contrary to our expectations, we find that firms with lower Leverage experience larger 
value increases over the 250-day period. Consistent with our expectations, Firm Size is negative 
and statistically significant at better than the 1% level in all four models, indicating that size is 
negatively related to the increase in firm value. This smaller value increase for larger firms 
could reflect the lower information asymmetry at larger firms. The negative relation between 
firm size and the value change could also indicate that it is more difficult to restructure a larger 
firm. 
In summary, the cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal returns shows no 
consistent evidence that State Bureaucrats are less effective monitors than MOSOEs. However, 
we do find consistent evidence that investors perceive Private Entities as the most effective 
monitors of listed firms. 
5.2.4 Changes in Accounting Performance 
Columns 6-9 of Table 8 present the results for changes in peer-adjusted return on assets 
(Columns 6-7) and peer-adjusted return on equity (Columns 8-9). The evidence in these four 
columns consistently shows that improvements in operating performance are larger and 
statistically significant where Private Entities replace State Bureaucrats or MOSOEs as the 
block holder. The coefficients indicate that, relative to transfers between Private Entities (the 
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omitted dummy variables), very substantial improvements in ROA of 260 basis points or more 
are realized after block transfers from State Bureaucrats or MOSOEs to Private Entities. The 
results for the subsample of transfers greater than 20% are even stronger at 530 basis points or 
more.  
Using ROE as performance measure (columns 8-9), we find that relative improvements 
are 520 basis points or more in the full sample, and 810 basis points or more in the subsample 
of transfers greater than 20%. If a block is sold to a State Bureaucrat, performance is 
significantly worse relative to having a Private Entity as the buyer. However, when a MOSOE 
is the new owner, the listed firm does not significantly under-perform listed firms where a 
Private Entity is the new owner.  
The coefficients of Largest Change and Percentage are insignificant. As before, we had 
expected that transfers creating a new controlling block holder would be associated with greater 
improvements in accounting-based performance measures, but this does not appear to be the 
case when we control for the type of block transfer.  
With the exception of firm size, all control variables are insignificant. The negative 
relation between the improvement in firm performance and firm size suggests that it is more 
difficult for new block holders to transform larger firms. 
5.2.5 CEO turnover 
In Columns 10 through 13 of Table 8 are the results from a logistic regression, where 
the dependent variable is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm’s CEO was 
replaced within 3 months (Columns 10-11) or twelve months (Columns 12-13) of the block 
trade announcement. In each cell, we now report the marginal effect with the t-statistic 
underneath.  
After inclusion of the control variables, we find only limited evidence that the 
ownership type affects CEO replacement. For the full sample, replacement of the CEO within 3 
months is significantly lower by 10 percentage points when a State Bureaucrat is seller. This 
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coefficient falls to 8 percent when we use CEO replacement within 12 months as dependent 
variable, and loses statistical significance at standard levels (p-value=0.15).  
The control variables are more effective in explaining CEO turnover. The variable 
Related is negative and significant, suggesting that the probability of CEO replacement within 
12 months is lower if the block is transferred to a related party. The variable Largest Change, 
which indicates that the new block holder is also a new controlling block holder, is positive and 
generally significant, indicating that changes in direct control lead to a greater probability of 
CEO turnover. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find that Leverage is related to CEO 
turnover. However, Size is negative and generally significant, indicating that larger firms are 
significantly less likely to experience a change in top management following a block transfer.  
We speculate that this result also may be a consequence of the stronger political connections of 
CEOs at China’s larger firms. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, we analyze share price reactions and changes in accounting performance 
around the announcements of negotiated block transfers between different ownership structures, 
using a sample of firms that are publicly traded on Chinese stock exchanges.  We also analyze 
top-management turnover following these block transfers.  
First and foremost, we find positive abnormal returns around the announcements of the 
block transfers, consistent with Barclay and Holderness (1991) that block transfers are control 
events. Moreover, we find that both changes in firm value and accounting performance are 
significantly greater when ownership is transferred from State Bureaucrats or Market-Oriented 
SOEs, than when ownership is transferred from Private Entities.  The improvements in 
performance following block transfers from State-controlled entities to private owners indicates 
that the latter are better equipped and have greater incentives to monitor and discipline firm 
management than are the former. This result is consistent with a superior incentives and 
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expertise of private block holders relative to State-controlled block holders. We find no 
consistent evidence that Market-Oriented SOEs are superior monitors relative to State 
Bureaucrats. This result is important, as it suggests that the intermediate step of “corporatizing” 
organizations that act as block holders is an ineffective mechanism for dealing with the agency 
problems that result from State ownership.  
Our results provide strong evidence that the block transfers between the different 
ownership categories are true control events, as defined by Barclay and Holderness (1991).  
First, they result in large positive cumulative abnormal returns of more than 10%, and the cross-
sectional variation in these abnormal returns can be explained by differences in identities of the 
block holders.  Second, the block transfers are followed by top management changes within 3 
months of the transfer at more than 20% of the sample firms.  Our interpretation of these block 
transfers as significant control events is further corroborated by the evidence that the value 
changes around transfers are strongly correlated with improvements in accounting performance 
around the block transfer. Hence, we contribute new evidence from Chinese markets confirming 
that the identity of the block holder is an important determinant of firm value.   
Finally, it is remarkable that the improvements in performance around the block 
transfers to private entities in our sample are substantially larger than the changes in 
performance observed after Share-Issue Privatization (SIP) in China (see Sun and Tong, 2003). 
The common explanation for the limited success of the SIP process in China is that the SIPs 
failed to transfer true control from the State to the private sector and only helped to create many 
dispersed and powerless owners of Tradable A shares. Our evidence is consistent with this 
explanation and shows that substantial value increases are realized when the State relinquishes 
substantial control rights to private block holders.  Of great interest is how further or complete 
privatization of listed State-controlled firms will affect firm value.  Many such transfers of 
control are now taking place in China, and we leave this as an interesting avenue for future 
research.  
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Appendix 1 
Shares are classified based on the residency of their owner as domestic (A shares) or 
foreign (B, H and N shares).  The B, H, and N shares are traded on the Chinese, Hong Kong, 
and New York Stock Exchanges, respectively.  Tradable B shares used to be available 
exclusively to foreign investors and some authorized domestic securities firms. However, the 
Chinese government recently opened the B-share market to domestic investors. The B-share 
market is separated from the A-share market, with SHSE B-shares denominated in U.S. dollars, 
and SZSE B-shares denominated in Hong Kong dollars. Tradable H shares and Tradable N 
shares are essentially the same as Tradable B shares, except that they are issued and traded on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange, respectively. 
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Appendix 2: 
Examples of Share Price Manipulation in China 
 
One example of share price manipulation is the Zhongke Changye scandal (See 
Business China, March 26th 2001, pp. 2-3, “Scam of the century”). This particular case started 
with a sharp decrease in the stock price of Zhongke Changye—a listed chicken farm—due to an 
outbreak of bird flu in 1998. The share price dropped to around 14 Rmb in Oct 1998. Mr. Lu 
convinced the largest holder of tradable shares of Zhongke Changye—Mr. Zhu—to transfer 
blocks of tradable shares to him and persuaded several block holders to transfer their State 
shares to high tech companies owned by him. Mr. Lu, who now effectively controlled the firm, 
was in a position to manipulate the flow of public information. In addition, he used thousands of 
ID cards to open new individual share holder accounts, which were used to buy shares. In this 
process, Mr. Lu used the newly purchased shares as collateral to buy even more shares. The 
share price increased to about 40 Rmb in May 1999 when Mr. Zhu (unbeknownst to Mr. Lu) 
started selling. Still, the share price increased further and reached a high of 84 Rmb in February 
2000 before it collapsed and the scam was revealed. 
Another example is the Yellow River Chemical scandal (SHSE ticker 600091). This 
case began on December 23, 1998, with the sale of a subsidiary of Yellow River to Baotuo 
Chuangye. Baotuo Chuangye, in turn, was partially owned by Beida Tomorrow Materials 
Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“Beida Materials”)—a firm linked to the Beijing University 
group. Sale of the subsidiary resulted in more than 30 percent increase in Yellow River 
Chemical’s profits, which would give the firm the right to issue new shares. On July 29, 1999, 
press reports announced that Beida Materials had bought 47 percent of the shares of the parent 
of Yellow River—Baotou Chemical Industry Group. When the transfer was announced, the 
share price of Yellow River Chemical was 24.5 Rmb—almost double its 12.8 Rmb price two 
months earlier. The gradual increase in share price during the two months before the 
announcement was allegedly attributable to insider trading. Supposedly, insiders were buying 
Yellow River Chemical shares in anticipation of a positive reaction of investors to the share 
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transfer, which suggested a move away from the chemical industry into the high tech industry. 
However, in the six weeks following the announcement, the share price of Yellow River 
Chemical dropped almost 20 percent, which was attributed to profit taking by insiders. (See 
Larry Lang in New Fortune magazine, August 2001) 
A very similar incident, where a block transfer suggested a link to Beijing University, 
took place on August 25, 1999 when 51 percent of the shares in the second largest shareholder 
of Huazi Shiye (SHSE ticker 600191) were transferred to Beida Materials. In the three months 
prior to the transfer announcement, the share price of Huazi Shiye increased from 13.3 RMB to 
22.58 RMB; in the three months subsequent to the transfer announcement, Huazi Shiye’s share 
price declined to 15.6 RMB. 
It is noteworthy that, in both the Yellow River Chemical and Huazi Shiye examples, the 
block transfer took place in the shares of a firm that controlled a listed firm, rather than in the 
shares of the listed firm itself. It is easier to conduct such transfers anonymously because 
disclosure requirements are much less stringent for share transfers of unlisted firms.   
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Appendix 3: 
Reasons for CEO Turnover 
 
The 13 categorized reasons for CEO turnover available from the GTA corporate 
governance database are: (1) change of work assignment—the CEO was removed from the 
position because of being assigned another position; (2) retirement—the CEO no longer held 
the position because of retirement or age; (3) expiration of term of office—the CEO no longer 
held the position because her term expired and she was not re-elected; (4) change of share-
controlling rights—the CEO no longer held the position because of a change in the identity of 
the controlling shareholder ; (5) resignation—the predecessor voluntarily resigned the position 
for unknown reasons; (6) dismissal—a listed company dismissed the predecessor for unknown 
reasons; (7) health related reason—the predecessor no longer held the position because of bad 
health, including death; (8) personal reason—the CEO no longer held the position because of 
personal reasons;  (9) corporate governance improvement—improving corporate governance 
led to the CEO no longer holding the position; (10) litigation involved—the CEO was removed 
from office because of involvement in litigation; (11)  others; (12) end of proxy—the CEO 
holding the position in deputy no longer exercised the duty because of end of the deputy; and 
(13) not disclosed. We combine (2), (6), (7), (8), (10), (11) and (12) into our “other” category 
because of the small numbers of CEO turnovers accounted for these categories. 
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Appendix Table 1: 
Panel A 
Summary of Privatization Studies 
 
Authors Sample Finding
Multi-Country Studies
Boardman and Vining 
(1989)
500 largest non-U.S. industrial firms as compiled by Forbes 
magazine in 1983.
Find that mixed enterprises perform at least as well as SOEs, and that private enterprises outperform 
both mixed enterprises and SOEs in terms of profitability.
Megginson, Nash and 
Randenborgh (1994)
61 SOEs from 18 countries in 32 industries that were 
partially or completely privatized during 1961-90.
Find significant increases in sales, profitability, capex spending, dividend payouts, operating efficiency 
and employment and significant decreases in leverage.
Boubakri and Cosset 
(1998)
79 SOEs in 21 developing countries that underwent partial 
or complete share-issuance privatizations during 1980-92.
Find significant increases in profitability, operating efficiency, capex spending, output, employment 
and dividends.
D'Souza and Megginson 
(1999)
85 share-isuance privatizations from 28 industrialized 
countries that occurred from 1990-96.
Find significant increases in profitability, output, operating efficiency and divdend payments and 
significant decreases in leverage following privatization.
Jones, Megginson, Nash, 
and Netter (1999)
630 share-issuance privatizations in 59 countries during 
1977-97
The State consistently underprices SIP offerings, favor domestic investors in share allocations, impose 
control restrictions, and typically use fixed-price issues.
Boubakri, Cosset and 
Guedhami (2005a, b)
209 privatized firms from 325 emerging-market and 14 
industrial countries during 1980-2001.
Private ownership, primarily by local institutions, grows more concentrated over time. Investor 
protection and both social and political stability, as well as firm size, growth and industry, are important 
determinants of ownership concentration.
D’Souza, Megginson and 
Nash (2005) 
129 share-issuance privatizations from 23 OECD countries 
during 1961-1999.
Post-privatization performance improvements in developed countries result from changes in 
government and foreign ownership affecting employment and capital expenditures.
Kole and Mulherin 
(1997)
17 U.S. firms owned by German and Japanese companies 
and seized by the government during and following WWII.
Performance of government-owned firms was not significantly different from that of privately owned 
firms in the same industry.
Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001)
1,369 firm-year observations on government-owned and 
privately owned firms sampled from the 500 largest 
corporations worldwide as reported by Forbes magazine in 
1975, 1985 and 1995.
Government-owned firms are consistently less profitable than privately owned firms. Profitability 
improves prior to, but declines subsequent to, share-issuance privatization of government-owned firms.
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Appendix Table 1:  
Panel B 
Summary of Partial Privatization Studies 
 
Authors Sample Finding
Partial Privatization
Groves, Hong, McMillan 
and Naughton (1995) 769 Chinese SOEs surveyed during 1980-89.
When authority shifts from the State- to the firm-level and firms were allowed to retain more of their 
profits, firm managers improved workers' incentives, resulting in increased productivity.
Li (1997) Panel data on 272 Chinese SOEs between 1980 and 1989.
New incentive mechanisms put into place led to greater product market competition and better factor 
allocation, even without formal privatization.
Aivazian, Ge and Qiu 
(2005) 
429 Chinese SOEs restructured into corporations under the 
Corporate Law of 1993 Corporatization significantly improved performance as measured by profitability and efficiency.
Allen, Qian and Qian 
(2005)
State, listed and private sectors of the Chinese economy 
during 1997-2002.
Rapid economic growth was driven by the private sector. Within the listed sector, dividend yields and 
firm values are lower than those of comparable firms in countries with better legal protection.
Sun and Tong (2003)
634 Chinese firms that were partially privatized by IPOs 
during 1994-98.
Sales, earnings and productivity improve but profitability deteriorates following partial privatization by 
initial public offerings. 
Wei, Varela, D’Souza and 
Hassan (2003) 
208 Chinese corporations that were partially privatized 
during 1990-97.
Following share issuance, real output, real assets and sales efficiency improve while leverage declines, 
but profitability is unchanged.
Gupta (2005) 339 Indian SOEs partially privatized during 1990-2000.
Partial privatization significantly improves performance and the source of the gains is a reduction in 
agency costs that improve firm efficiency.
Wei, Xie and Zhang 
(2005) 
5,284 firm-year observations for Chinese firms that were 
partially privatized during 1991-2001.
State and legal-person ownership are negatively related while foreign ownership is positively related to 
firm value as measured by Tobin's Q.
Fan, Wong and Zhang 
(2007) 790 partially privatized Chinese firms during 1993-2001.
Politically connected firms exhibit sigificantly inferior performance relative to their unconnected 
counterparts, on both accounting and market-value bases.
Deng, Gan and He (2007) 295 Chinese SOEs that went public during 1997 - 2000.
Parent-company block holders are more llikely to tunnel resources from listed firms than are other types 
of block holders.
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Table 1: 
Share classifications for the Chinese Stock Market for 1993-2002 based upon NUS ownership categories 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
State Bureaucrat 53 77 121 166 179 160 144 153 154 155
MOSOE 46 71 141 277 462 572 681 796 836 888
Private Entity 13 12 23 35 44 63 78 103 121 155
Foreign Entity 9 10 13 18 16 13 11 15 13 13
 
This table reports share classifications for the Chinese Stock Market for 1993-2002 based upon NUS ownership categories. State Bureaucrat is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the largest block holder classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a market-oriented 
State-owned enterprise; Private Entity is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a private entity. Foreign is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
largest block holder is a foreign entity. Because of their small number, we exclude foreign entities from the remainder of our analysis, so that we are left with only 
three ownership categories. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at the National University of 
Singapore (“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). Note that NUS researchers were unable to classify ultimate ownership for a small number of firms in some 
years. Source: Authors’ tabulations based upon NUS ownership categories. 
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Table 2: 
Descriptive Statistics for Negotiated Block Transfers  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Shares Transferred 22.0 15.5 5.0 74.8
Size 20.5 0.8 18.1 23.8
Leverage 0.47 0.29 0.01 4.87
Peer-adjusted ROA -0.008 0.067 -0.403 0.284
Change in EXROP 0.009 0.141 -2.310 1.550
 
Panel B: Number of Transfers for each Seller/Buyer pair
State Private
Seller Bureaucrat MOSOE Entity All
State Bureaucrat 38 80 49 167
MOSOE 39 187 114 340
Private Entity 8 41 75 124
All 85 308 238 631
Buyer
 
Panel C: Transfer Percentage for each Seller/Buyer pair
State Private
Seller Bureaucrat MOSOE Entity All
State Bureaucrat 28.24 31.12 17.64 26.51
MOSOE 22.67 25.18 16.34 22.01 Test 1:  
Private Entity 21.05 17.76 14.80 17.64 p -value = 0.01
All 25.01 25.73 16.12 22.01
Test 2: p -value = 0.01
Buyer
Panel D: Firm Size for each Seller/Buyer pair
State Private
Seller Bureaucrat MOSOE Entity All
State Bureaucrat 20.61 20.57 20.37 20.52
MOSOE 20.66 20.61 20.47 20.58 Test 1:  
Private Entity 19.92 20.09 20.21 20.09 p -value = 0.01
All 20.57 20.53 20.37 20.48
Test 2: p -value = 0.05
Buyer
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Panel E: Leverage for each Seller/Buyer pair
State Private
Seller Bureaucrat MOSOE Entity All
State Bureaucrat 0.445 0.485 0.483 0.48
MOSOE 0.475 0.468 0.486 0.48 Test 1:
Private Entity 0.381 0.440 0.441 0.43 p -value = 0.46
All 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47
Test 2: p- value = 0.87
Buyer
Panel F: Peer-Adjusted ROA for each Seller/Buyer Pair
State Private
Seller Bureaucrat MOSOE Entity All
State Bureaucrat -0.006 -0.006 -0.018 -0.009
MOSOE 0.003 -0.015 -0.009 -0.011 Test 1:
Private Entity 0.019 0.004 0.002 0.004  p -value = 0.11
All 0.001 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008
Test 2: p -value = 0.44
Buyer
Panel G: Change in Level of Expropriation for each Seller/Buyer Pair
State Private
Seller Bureaucrat MOSOE Entity All
State Bureaucrat 0.006 0.018 0.02 0.016
MOSOE -0.005 0.028 -0.018 0.009 Test 1:
Private Entity 0.006 -0.009 0.008 0.001  p -value = 0.70
All 0.001 0.021 -0.002 0.009
Test 2: p -value = 0.12
Buyer
This table reports descriptive statistics for our sample of 631 observations of block-share transfers between 
different ownership categories during 1998-2002. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for five variables:  
Shares Transferred is the percentage of total common shares transferred in the block trade; Size is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; Leverage is measured by ratio of the book value of total 
liabilities to the book value of total assets; and Peer-Adjusted ROA is the firm’s core EBITDA divided by 
the book value of total assets as of year-end less core EBITDA divided by the book value of total assets for 
a matched firm, where matched firms are in the same industry and have the lowest absolute value of the 
difference in the ratio of core EBITDA over total assets in the pre-transfer year relative to the sample firm 
across all firms in the same industry.  EXPROP is the level of expropriation as proxied by the value of 
potentially harmful related-party transactions observed during the year before and during the year after the 
year of the block transfer and scaled by total assets, as described in Berkman, Cole and Fu (2010). Panel B 
presents the number of transfers for each seller/buyer pair. Panel C presents the percentage of shares 
transferred for each seller/buyer pair. Panel D presents the firm size for each seller/buyer pair. Panel E 
presents firm leverage for each seller/buyer pair. Panel F presents peer-adjusted ROA for each seller/buyer 
pair. Panel G presents the change in EXPROP for each seller/buyer pair. Seller refers to the party selling 
the block of shares while Buyer refers to the party purchasing the block of shares. There are three 
ownership categories (State Bureaucrat, MOSOE and Private Entity) so there are nine combinations of 
buyer and seller. State Bureaucrat is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified 
as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a 
market-oriented State-owned enterprise; Private Entity is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block 
holder is classified as a private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate 
ownership established by researchers at the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) as described in 
Delios et al. (2006). Test 1 (Test 2) refers to the p-value from an F-test for equality of means across the 
three different types of sellers (buyers). 
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Table 3: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Announcements of Negotiated Block Transfers  
By Type of Block Transfer 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. t-statistic Minimum Maximum
Transfers CAR(-210,40) 631 *** 0.370 11.59 -1.46 2.33
Greater than 5% CAR(-3,1) 631 *** 0.043 6.57 -0.32 0.20
Transfers CAR(-210,40) 292 *** 0.402 8.91 -1.47 1.49
Greater than 20% CAR(-3,1) 292 *** 0.048 6.21 -0.10 0.20
State
Seller Bureaucrat MOSOE Private All
0.172 *** 0.214 *** 0.250 *** 0.216 ***
38 80 49 167
0.111 *** 0.185 *** 0.158 *** 0.167 ***
39 187 114 340
0.106 0.106 0.128 *** 0.119 ** Test 1:
8 41 75 124       p -value=0.04
0.138 *** 0.181 *** 0.166 *** 0.171 ***
85 308 238 631
Test 2: p -value=0.62
State
Seller Bureaucrat MOSOE Private All
0.209 *** 0.266 *** 0.336 *** 0.264 ***
27 56 19 102  
0.171 0.198 *** 0.246 *** 0.205 ***
17 99 33 149
-0.026 0.039 0.168 ** 0.093  Test 1:
4 18 19 41   p -value=0.05
0.176 *** 0.203 *** 0.249 *** 0.210 ***
48 173 71 292
Test 2: p -value = 0.58
State Bureaucrat
MOSOE
Private
All
Buyer
Panel B: CARs for transfers > 5% of Common Shares by Type of Transfer
State Bureaucrat
MOSOE
Private
All
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around transfer announcements
Panel C: CARs for transfers > 20% of Common Shares by Type of Transfer
Buyer
0.171
0.011
0.210
0.017
 
This table presents cumulative abnormal returns around announcements of block transfers, by the type of 
block transfer. Cumulative abnormal returns around announcements of block transfers are calculated as the 
difference between the realized return and the market return using the market-adjusted return model. To 
estimate the market-adjusted model, we use as the market index either the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) composite index, depending on where the firm’s stock is 
listed. Our primary event window spans day t–210 through day t+40. We also examine abnormal returns 
from a shorter five-day window from day t–3 through day t+1. The sample consists of 631 observations of 
block share transfers of more than five percent of common shares between different ownership categories 
during 1998-2002. There are three ownership categories (State Bureaucrat, MOSOE and Private Entity) so 
there are nine combinations of buyer and seller. State Bureaucrat is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
largest block holder is classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
largest block holder is classified as a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; and Private Entity is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a private entity. Classifications are 
based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at the National 
University of Singapore (“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). Panel A presents results for the full 
sample of 631 transfers, while Panel B presents detailed results by ownership classification for the full 
sample of 631 transfers greater than 5% of shares, and Panel C presents detailed results for 292 block 
transfers greater than 20% of shares.  
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: 
Changes in Accounting Performance  
Surrounding Negotiated Block Transfers at Listed Chinese Firms 
N Mean Std. Dev. t -stat Minimum Maximum
Transfers ∆ ROA 525 0.014 *** 0.100 3.19 -0.396 0.517
> 5% ∆ ROE 525 0.019 ** 0.172 2.28 -0.526 0.679
Transfers ∆  ROA 249 0.017 *** 0.105 2.55 -0.396 0.381
>20% ∆ ROE 249 0.029 ** 0.179 2.29 -0.455 0.527
State
Bureaucrat MOSOE Private All
   State Bureaucrat 0.012 0.014 * 0.024 ** 0.017 ***
34 67 36 137
-0.026 ** 0.026 ** 0.023 ** 0.019 ***
34 162 89 285
-0.021 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
7 36 60 103
-0.008 * 0.019 *** 0.016 ** 0.014
75 265 185 525
Test 2: p-value=0.04
State
Bureaucrat MOSOE Private All
0.008 0.018 0.057 *** 0.023 **
24 48 15 87
-0.009 0.025 ** 0.038 ** 0.024 **
15 84 27 126
-0.067 0.000 -0.024 -0.019       Test 1:  
2 17 17 36       p-value=0.07
-0.004 0.020 ** 0.026 ** 0.017
41 149 59 249
Test 2: p-value=0.31
Panel A: Changes in ROA and Changes in ROE
Panel B: Changes in ROA for Transfers > 5% of Common Shares by Type of Transfer
Panel C: Changes in ROA for Transfers > 20% of Common Shares by Type of Transfer
Buyer
Seller
           MOSOE
           Private
           All
      Test 1:  
           All
Seller
   State Bureaucrat
           MOSOE
           Private
      p-value=0.15
Buyer
 
This table reports changes in accounting performance surrounding negotiated block transfers at listed 
Chinese firms. Changes in accounting performance are measured by the changes in peer-adjusted return on 
assets (ROA) or peer-adjusted return on equity (ROE) from the two years prior to the block transfer to the 
two years subsequent to the block transfer. The sample consists of 631 observations of block share transfers 
of more than five percent of common shares between different ownership categories during 1998-2002. 
There are three ownership categories (State Bureaucrat, MOSOE and Private Entity) so there are nine 
combinations of buyer and seller. State Bureaucrat is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block 
holder is classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block 
holder is classified as a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; Private Entity is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the largest block holder is classified as a private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed 
categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at the National University of Singapore 
(“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). Panel A presents results for the full sample of 631 transfers, 
while Panel B presents detailed results by ownership classification for the full sample of 631 transfers 
greater than 5% of shares, and Panel C presents detailed results for 292 block transfers greater than 20% of 
shares.  
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5:   
Correlations between CARs and Changes in Accounting Performance 
 
CAR (t-210, t+40) CAR (t-3, t+1)
Change in ROA 0.258 *** 0.111 ***
Change in ROE 0.309 *** 0.168 ***
 
 
This table presents the Spearman correlation coefficient between the cumulative abnormal return around 
525 block transfers of listed firms in China in the period 1998 through 2002 and changes in peer-adjusted 
return on assets and return on equity. We use the market-adjusted return model to calculate daily abnormal 
returns as the difference between the realized return and the market return. The CAR is measured over a 
window that spans day t-210 through day t+40, and a 5-day window from day t-3 through day t+1. ROA is 
the firm’s core EBITDA divided by the book value of total assets as of year-end less EBITDA divided by 
the book value of total assets for a matched firm, where matched firms are in the same industry and have 
the lowest absolute value of the difference in the ratio of EBITDA over total assets in the pre-transfer year 
relative to the sample firm across all firms in the same industry.   Peer-adjusted return on equity (ROE) is 
defined analogously, but is based on the firm’s core EBITDA divided by the book value of equity as of 
year-end.  Change in ROA/ROE is the difference in the average for the two years prior to the 
announcement and the average for two years subsequent to the announcement. The year of the 
announcement is excluded from the analysis.  
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: 
CEO Turnover following Announcements of Block Transfers 
 
N Mean Std Dev. t -stat Minimum Maximum
Transfers > 5%
     Within 3 months 631 0.22 *** 0.41 13.2 0 1
     Withing 12 months 631 0.38 *** 0.49 19.5 0 1
Transfers > 20%
     Within 3 months 292 0.30 *** 0.46 11.1 0 1
     Within 12 months 292 0.50 *** 0.50 16.9 0 1
State Bureaucrat MOSOE Private Entity All
0.211 *** 0.175 *** 0.163 *** 0.180 ***
38 80 49 167
0.103 *** 0.214 *** 0.237 *** 0.209 *** Test 1:
39 187 114 340 p-value=0.07
0.375 *** 0.366 *** 0.240 *** 0.290 ***
8 41 75 124
     All 0.176 *** 0.224 *** 0.223 *** 0.217 ***
85 308 238 631
Test 2: p-value=0.62
State Bureaucrat MOSOE Private Entity All
0.185 *** 0.232 *** 0.368 *** 0.245 ***
27 56 19 102
0.118 *** 0.293 *** 0.364 *** 0.289 *** Test 1:
17 99 33 149 p-value=0.03
0.500 *** 0.444 *** 0.474 *** 0.463 ***
4 18 19 41
All 0.188 *** 0.289 *** 0.394 *** 0.298 ***
48 173 71 292
Test 2: p-value=0.04
Buyer
       Private Entity
     MOSOE
     Private Entity
       MOSOE
Seller
   State Bureaucrat
Panel C: CEO Turnover in the 3 Months After Block Transfers > 20%
Panel B: CEO Turnover in the 3 months After Announcements of Block Transfers > 5%
Panel A: CEO Turnover in the 3 Months, or 12 Months, After Transfer Announcement
   State Bureaucrat
Seller
Buyer
 
Panel D: Reason for CEO Turnover 
Reason for CEO Turnover
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Change of Work Assignment 345 0.065 0.28 14 0.089  0.10 43 0.068 0.18
Expiration of Term of Office 290 0.055 0.23 28 0.178 *** 0.20 54 0.086 *** 0.23
Change of Share Controlling Right 120 0.023 0.10 58 0.368 *** 0.42 78 0.124 *** 0.33
Resignation 229 0.043 0.18 24 0.152 *** 0.18 37 0.059 * 0.16
Corporate Governance Improvement 31 0.006 0.03 0 0.000  0.00 3 0.005 0.01
Missing 77 0.015 0.06 9 0.057 *** 0.07 14 0.022  0.06
Other 148 0.028 0.12 4 0.025 0.03 9 0.014 *** 0.04
Total 1,240     0.235 1.00 137 0.869 1.00 238 0.377 1.00
All Firms Transfer >5% Sample Transfer >5% Sample
1998-2002 CEO Change < 3 months CEO Change < 12 months
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This table reports CEO turnover during the 3 months, or 12 months, following announcement of 631 
negotiated block transfers of at least 5% of common shares between different ownership categories for 
listed firms in China during 1998–2002. There are three ownership categories (State Bureaucrat, MOSOE 
and Private Entity) so there are nine combinations of buyer and seller. State Bureaucrat is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; 
Private Entity is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a private entity. 
Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at 
the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). Panel A presents results 
for the full sample of 631 transfers, while Panel B presents detailed results by ownership classification for 
the full sample of 631 transfers greater than 5% of shares, and Panel C presents detailed results for 292 
block transfers greater than 20% of shares. Panel D reports the reasons for CEO changes during 1098-2002 
at all Chinese listed firms and separately for the 137 (238) firms in our sample that experienced a CEO 
change during the three (twelve) months following announcement of a block transfers greater than 5% of 
common shares outstanding. The total number of CEO changes appear in Columns 2, 5 and 8; the number 
of CEO changes per firm-year appear in Columns 3, 6 and 9; and the percentage of the total number of 
CEO changes for that group accounted for by each reason identified in column (1) appear in Columns 4, 7 
and 10. Next to Columns 6 and 9 are significance results from a binomial test of proportions relative to the 
proportion in Column 3. 
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: 
Probit Selection Equation to Identify Chinese Firms that Experienced a Negotiated Block 
Transfer 
 
Marginal
Variable Effect t-statistic
ROA
 i, t-1 -0.003 *** -5.0
Firm Size
 i, t-1 -0.028 *** -6.0
Largest Percentage
 i, t-1 -0.003 *** -13.7
State Bureaucrat
 i, t-1 -0.076 *** -6.0
MOSOE
 i, t-1 -0.043 *** -3.8
 
 
This table reports results from estimating a probit selection equation to identify Chinese listed firms that 
experienced a negotiated block transfer during 1998-2002. The sample consists of 5,679 firm-year 
observations on Chinese listed firms during 1998 – 2002 where 631 negotiated block transfers of more than 
five percent of common shares between firms occurred. The dependent variable takes on a value of one for 
the 631 firm-years in which a negotiated block transfer took place and a value of zero for all other firm-
years. The explanatory variables are: accounting performance measured by ROA
 i, t-1,, the peer-adjusted 
return on assets in t-1, the year prior to the block transfer; Firm Size
 i, t-1 as measured by the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s total assets in year t-1; Largest Percentage
 i, t-1, the percentage of shares owned by the 
largest shareholder in year t-1; and ownership classifications State Bureaucrat
 i, t-1 and MOSOE i, t-1. The 
three ownership categories are State Bureaucrat, MOSOE and Private. State Bureaucrat is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the largest block holder classified as a State Bureaucrat in year t-1; MOSOE is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a market-oriented State-owned enterprise in year 
t-1; and Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a private entity in year t-1, 
and is the omitted category to avoid collinearity. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of 
ultimate ownership established by researchers at the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) as 
described in Delios et al. (2006).  
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: 
Cross-sectional Regression Results Analyzing Outcomes Following Announcements of Negotiated Block Transfers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
>5% > 20% > 5% > 20% > 5% > 20% > 5% > 20% > 5% > 20% > 5% > 20%
CAR_250 CAR_250 CAR_5 CAR_5 ROA ROA ROE ROE CEO_3 CEO_3 CEO_12 CEO_12
Intercept 1.953 2.616 0.133 0.225 0.174 0.425 0.984 1.134
5.0 *** 4.1 *** 2.9 *** 2.9 *** 1.5 2.2 ** 4.5 *** 3.2 ***
Seller
   State Bureaucrat 0.124 0.258 0.008 0.019 0.027 0.060 0.052 0.081 -0.100 -0.118 -0.080 -0.117
2.7 *** 3.3 *** 1.5 2.0 ** 2.0 ** 2.8 *** 2.1 *** 2.0 ** -2.1 ** -1.4 -1.4 -1.3
   MOSOE 0.077 0.189 0.011 0.020 0.026 0.053 0.056 0.089 -0.058 -0.089 -0.035 -0.061
2.0 ** 2.6 *** 2.4 ** 2.3 ** 2.3 ** 2.7 ** 2.5 ** 2.3 ** -1.4 -1.2 -0.7 -0.7
Buyer
   State Bureacrat -0.052 -0.087 -0.007 -0.008 -0.021 -0.019 -0.052 -0.073 -0.001 -0.096 0.032 -0.089
-1.1 -1.1 -1.3 -0.9 -1.5 -0.9 -2.0 ** -1.8 * 0.0 -1.0 0.5 -0.9
   MOSOE -0.007 -0.055 -0.010 -0.019 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.035 0.016 -0.037 0.063 0.002
-0.2 -0.9 -2.4 ** -2.7 *** -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -1.1 0.4 -0.5 1.5 0.0
Related 0.028 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.022 0.016 0.017 -0.056 -0.037 -0.139 -0.177
0.6 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.6 1.1 0.7 0.5 -1.0 -0.5 -2.2 ** -2.1 **
Largest Change 0.002 -0.037 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.000 -0.011 -0.025 0.107 0.120 0.192 0.175
0.1 -0.6 1.1 0.3 0.7 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 2.7 *** 1.5 4.1 *** 2.2 **
Percentage Transferred 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000
 1.0 0.3 1.9 * 0.9 1.2 2.3 ** 1.0 1.6 2.3 ** 0.9 0.8 0.1
Leverage -0.045 -0.216 0.002 0.017 0.039 0.045 -0.013 -0.072 0.011 0.002 0.007 0.161
-1.9 * -2.0 ** 0.6 1.4 2.9 *** 1.5 -0.3 -1.0 0.6 -0.2 0.2 1.1
Size -0.091 -0.116 -0.006 -0.011 -0.008 -0.022 -0.047 -0.052 -0.048 -0.047 -0.101 -0.096
-4.4 *** -3.3 *** -2.7 *** -2.7 *** -1.2 -2.1 ** -3.9 *** -2.7 *** -2.0 ** -1.1 -3.7 *** -2.1 **
∆ EXPROP 0.005 -0.032 -0.012 -0.011 -0.015 -0.021 -0.038 -0.032 0.014 0.035 -0.083 0.072
0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.5 0.3
Lambda 0.000 -0.035 0.000 -0.002 -0.037 -0.057 -0.028 -0.064 -0.194 -0.208 -0.063 -0.117
0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -2.1 ** -1.7 -0.8 -0.9 -2.8 *** -1.6 -0.8 -0.9
Block Transfer Block Transfer Block Transfer Block Transfer Block Transfer Block Transfer
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This table reports results from a series of cross-sectional regressions analyzing outcomes following announcements of negotiated block transfers at Chinese listed firms 
during 1998-2002. Column (1) identifies the independent variable being analyzed. Columns (2) and (3) present the results for analysis of the 250-day cumulative abnormal 
return from t-210 to t+40 around the announcement of block transfers. Columns (4) and (5) present the results for analysis of the five-day cumulative abnormal returns from 
t-3 to t+1 around announcements of block transfers. Columns (6) and (7) present the results for analysis of changes in profitability as measured by ROA during the two years 
before to the two years after the year of block transfers. Columns (8) and (9) present the results for analysis of changes in profitability as measures by ROE during the two 
years before to the two years after the year of block transfers. Columns (10) and (11) present the results for analysis of CEO turnover during the 3 months following 
announcements of block transfers and columns (12) and (13) present the results for analysis of CEO turnover during 12 months following announcements of block transfers. 
For each pair of columns, the first presents results for block transfers greater than 5% of common shares outstanding while the second presents results for block transfers 
greater than 20% of common shares outstanding. 
The sample consists of 631 observations of block share transfers of more than five percent of common shares between different ownership categories during 1998-2002. 
There are three ownership categories (State Bureaucrat, MOSOE and Private Entity) so there are nine combinations of buyer and seller. State Bureaucrat is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a market 
oriented State-owned enterprise; Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 
detailed categories of ultimate ownership established researchers at the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). Related is dummy 
variable indicating that the buyer is a related party of the seller. Largest Change is a dummy variable indicating that the transfer created a new controlling block holder. 
Percentage Transferred is size of the block transfer as a percentage of outstanding shares. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets. ∆EXPROP is the change in the level of expropriation as proxied by the value of potentially harmful related-party transactions scaled by firm assets, as described 
in Berkman, Cole and Fu (2010). Lambda is the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated from an equation explaining the probability that a firm is involved in a negotiated block 
transfer, as shown in Table 7.  
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 59 
Figure 1: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around  
Announcements of Negotiated Block Transfers at Chinese Firms 
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This figure shows cumulative abnormal returns around announcements of block transfers at 
Chinese listed firms. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between 
the realized return and the market return using the market-adjusted return model. To estimate 
the market-adjusted model, we use as the market index either the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) composite index, depending on where the 
firm’s stock is listed. The sample consists of 631 observations of block share transfers of 
more than five percent of common shares between different ownership categories during 
1998-2002, of which 38 involve transfers from a State Bureaucrat to a State Bureaucrat 
(“SB2SB”) and 49 involve transfers from a State Bureaucrat to a Private Entity (“SB2PE”). 
There are three ownership categories (State Bureaucrat, MOSOE and Private Entity) so there 
are nine possible buyer-seller combinations. State Bureaucrat is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the largest block holder is classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the largest block holder is classified as a market-oriented State-owned 
enterprise; and Private Entity is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is 
classified as a private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate 
ownership established researchers at the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) as 
described in Delios et al. (2006). The graph shows CARs for the full sample and separately 
for the SB2SB and SB2PE subgroups.  
